International Lawyer
Volume 3

Number 2

Article 16

1969

International Law Cases in National Courts
Richard C. Allison

Recommended Citation
Richard C. Allison, International Law Cases in National Courts, 3 INT'L L. 416 (1969)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol3/iss2/16

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

Case Comments
International Law Cases in National Courts
RICHARD C. ALLISON*, Departmental Editor

A number of cases involving questions of international law have
been decided recently by both federal and state courts.
Production of Evidence Located in Foreign Jurisdictions
The Case of United States of America v. FirstNational City Bank, 396
F. 2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968), raises an issue that has become more
important with the increase in foreign trade and the number of
companies with branch offices abroad.
First National City Bank of New York refused to comply with a
subpoena duces tecum to produce certain documents located at its
office in Frankfurt, Germany in connection with a Federal Grand Jury
investigation of alleged violations of the United States antitrust laws by
two of its customers on the grounds that violation of bank secrecy
could subject the bank to civil liability and economic loss under the
laws of Germany. The court affirmed the lower court's decision holding
the bank and the officer responsible for the refusal in contempt, and
held that under international law a state which has jurisdiction to
enforce a law is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely
because it requires a person to engage in conduct subjecting him to
liability under the laws of another state which has jurisdiction with
respect to that conduct. Since the court had in personam jurisdiction
over the bank, it had the power to require the production of the
documents located in Germany despite the potential civil liability. In
reaching its decision the court, with the assistance of expert witnesses,
carefully reviewed the so-called "bank secrecy law" of Germany, which,
it was found, is not statutory but rather is in the nature of a privilege
that may be waived by the customer but not the bank. Weighing the
* Member of the New York Bar. Assisted by Charles C. Foster of the Texas Bar.
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value placed upon this privilege under German public policy against the
interest of the United States in the enforcement of its antitrust laws,
and noting that neither the German government nor the Department of
State had indicated that enforcement of the subpoena would violate
German public policy or embarrass German-American relations, the
court concluded that enforcement of the subpoena was warranted. It
expressly refrained from grounding its ruling upon the fact that the
bank would not risk criminal liability under German law by complying
with the subpoena, stating:
"But, the government urges vigorously, that to be excused from
compliance with an order of a federal court, a witness, such as Citibank,
must show that following compliance it will suffer criminal liability in
the foreign country. We would be reluctant to hold, however, that the
mere absence of criminal sanctions abroad necessarily mandates
obedience to a subpoena. Such a rule would show scant respect for
international comity; and, if this principle is valid, a court of one
country should make an effort to minimize possible conflict between
its orders and the law of a foreign state affected by its decision. Cf.
Restatement, supra, § 39(2); Ings v. Ferguson, supra, 282 F.2d at 152.
The vital national interests of a foreign nation, especially in matters
relating to economic affairs, can be expressed in ways other than
through the criminal law. For example, it could not be questioned that,
insofar as a court of the United States is concerned, a statement or
directive by the Bundesbank (the central bank of Germany) or some
other organ of government, expresses the public policy of Germany and
should be given appropriate weight. Equally important is the fact that a
sharp dichotomy between criminal and civil penalties is an imprecise
means of measuring the hardship for requiring compliance with a
subpoena. In Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, supra, this Court
affirmed the modification of a subpoena because strict obedience
would have resulted in a violation of Panamanian law punishable by a
fine of not more than 100 Balboas (equivalent to $100); we held that a
violation was the equivalent of a misdemeanor under our criminal law.
It would be a gross fiction to contend that if the Bundesbank were to
revoke the license of Citibank for a violation of bank secrecy the
impact would be less catastrophic than having to pay an insignificant
fine because the revocation is theoretically not 'equivalent to a
misdemeanor' or criminal sanction. We are not required to decide
whether penalties must be under the 'criminal law' to provide a legally
sufficient reason for noncompliance with a subpoena; but, it would
seem unreal to let all hang on whether the label 'criminal' were attached
to the sanction and to disregard all other factors. In any event, even
were we to assume arguendo that in appropriate circumstances civil
penalties or liabilities would suffice, we hold that Citibank has failed to
provide an adequate justification for its disobedience of the subpoena."
(396 F.2d at 901-902)
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Forum Non Conveniens
Ina death action against an airline company and the manufacturer
of the plane involving plaintiffs' decedents who were killed in Peru on a
flight that had originated in Brazil destined for California, an order
conditionally dismissing the complaint on the ground of forum non
conveniens was reversed and remitted to the lower court for reconsideration in the light of the facts referred to below. Varkonyi v. S.A.
Varig,-N.Y. 2d-,-N.E. 2d-(1968)

The New York Court of Appeals held that, since the defendant
foreign corporations were doing business in New York, there was no
statutory prohibition against the maintenance of the action there; and
that, while in general it is left to the discretion of the lower court to
decide whether to accept a suit between nonresident parties on a cause
of action having no nexus with this state, the lower court was in error
when it failed to take into account such special circumstances as the
unavailability elsewhere of a second forum in which the plaintiffs
would be able to obtain effective redress. It was also pointed out that
the plaintiffs from Europe, with limited means, would otherwise have
to pursue their action against one defendant in North America and
against the other defendant in South America, and that only in New
York could both defendants be brought together.
An action by plaintiff, a resident and citizen of Colombia, to
recover for personal injuries sustained by him in New York in 1966
while aboard a Panamanian ship was dismissed on motion on the
ground of forum non conveniens. Hernandez v. Cali, Inc.,-Misc.
2d-,-N. Y.S. 2d (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1968) Most of the "contacts" of
the case were in Panama, such as the contract of employment which
vested jurisdiction over such action in Panamanian courts and whereby
the defendant shipping company had agreed to accept process issued in
any Panamanian action.
Act of State Doctrine-Hickenlooper Amendment
The act of state doctrine-left for moribund if not dead after the
enactment of the Hickenlooper or Rule of Law amendment' to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961-shows signs of continuing vitality in a
four-to-three decision by the New York Court of Appeals which
1 U.S. Code, Tit. 22, § 2370 (e)(2), 78 State. 1009, 1013 [19641 as amended 79 Stat. 653

(1965).
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reverses the Appellate Division's finding 2 that certain action by an
agency of the Cuban Government did not constitute an act of state.
French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,-N.Y. 2d-,-N.E. 2d-(1968)
In 1957 plaintiff's assignor, Alexander Ritter, an American, made
a $345,000 investment in a Cuban farm at a time when Cuban
legislation, as an inducement to foreign investors, authorized them to
exchange the earnings from their investments for American dollars and
exempted such earnings from Cuba's tax on exportation of money.
After Fidel Castro had taken control of the Cuban Government, the
Cuban Currency Stabilization Fund in July 1959 issued Decision No.
346, ostensibly an exchange control measure, which suspended the
processing of certificates issued to investors under the earlier legislation.
When Ritter tendered his certificates with 150,000 Cuban pesos for
exchange, he was refused payment in U.S. dollars by the defendant
bank on the basis of Decision No. 346.
On appeal from the Appellate Division's judgment against the
defendant bank, the court held that in view of the State Department's
failure to file a "suggestion of sovereign immunity" and its conclusion
that the activities from which the present action arose were jure
gestionis, of a commercial nature, the court denied the defendant
bank's defense of sovereign immunity.
However, the court held that the act of state doctrine, as set out in
the original Sabbatino holding3 , which prohibits courts in the United
States from inquiring into the validity of the acts of a foreign
government done within its own territory or into whether such acts
were adopted in conformity with the internal procedures and requirements of the foreign state, was applicable. The majority judges
concluded that the breach of contract in question resulted from and in
a sense was in itself an act of state, and held that the court was barred
from making further inquiry unless the Hickenlooper Amendment
opened the way for it to do so.
The court found that the following wording from the
Hickenlooper Amendment did not encompass the facts at hand:
No court in the United States shall declin on the ground of the
federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits
giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a
claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party
2

See 2 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 359 (Jan. 1968).

3 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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including a foreign state ...

based upon (or traced through) a

confiscation or other taking ...by an act of that state in violation of
the principles of international law." [Emphasis supplied.

In the view of the majority judges, Ritter's loss was not due to any
taking of property but to the breach of a promise upon which he had
relied, and the language of the statute as well as its legislative history
indicated that the Hickenlooper Amendment was not intended to apply
to a breach of contract but was limited to situations, such as found in
Sabbatino, where a claim of title or other right to specific property had
been expropriated abroad. In other words, the majority felt that the primary objective of the legislation was to prevent the United States from
becoming an international "thieves' market" for property of American
nationals confiscated abroad.
Since under this construction the Hickenlooper Amendment was
not applicable and the act of state doctrine was determinative, it was
not necessary to consider whether the Cuban Government had offended
principles of international law. Nevertheless, the court, adverting to
currency regulation as practiced by communist and capitalist nations
alike (including the United States), stated that the control of national
currency and of foreign exchange is an essential governmental function
and that Cuba had a legitimate right to protect its scarce foreign
exchange reserves. Cuba's breach of its agreement to exchange Ritter's
pesos for dollars, while deplorable, was not so unreasonable "as to
outrage current international standards of governmental conduct." The
court suggested that plaintiff would have to seek her remedies in this
country through diplomatic efforts of the United States Government
and through legislation by Congress for the protection of American
interests in Cuba. A vigorous dissenting opinion written by Judge
Keating and joined in by the other two minority judges, contended that
a proper reading of the Hickenlooper amendment and of the Congressional intent leads to the conclusion that the facts under consideration
were within its ambit. Consistently with this analysis of the
amendment, the dissenting judges scrutinized Decision No. 346 to
determine whether it was in fact a legitimate exercise of a sovereign
nation's right to protect its international economic position or whether
it was a disguised act of confiscation. Considered in relation to the
entire matrix of economic regulations adopted by the Castro Government, the dissenting judges were persuaded that Decision No. 346 was
simply a part of a scheme to purge all American ownership from the
Cuban economy.
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Internal Revenue Code-Act of State Doctrine

In Louisa B. Gunther Farcasanu, 50 T.C. No. 89 (Sept. 17, 1968),
which provides a glimpse of life in Rumania during the post-World War
II years, a United States taxpayer was disallowed a "theft" deduction
under Sec. 165(c)(3) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue for her loss by confiscation of
valuable art objects and other personal property left with friends in
Rumania by the taxpayer after the death of her husband, the United
States Minister to Rumania in 1941.
The taxpayer in 1956 filed a claim for $295,716 with the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission citing certain decrees enacted by the
Communist Government in Rumania after 1945, one of which
confiscated goods "without a master", i.e., those goods of all kinds
which had been abandoned for one year or more by their owner
whether known or unknown. The Commission awarded the taxpayer
$103,445, and she received a payment of $33,782, which represented
her pro rata portion of the $22 million of Rumanian assets blocked by
the United States at the outset of World War II.
The court, relying on Sabbatino and other decisions, rejected the
taxpayer's argument that the seizure of her property was in violation of
Rumanian law and thus constituted a "theft" deductible under Sec.
165(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and held that such confiscations were under color of decrees issued by the Government of
Rumania and would not constitute a "theft" regardless of how
arbitrary they might have been.
Status of Forces Agreement-Criminal Jurisdiction
The case of Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1968)
reaffirms the international law principle that a sovereign state has
exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses committed within its territory,
unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction.
Petitioner Smallwood, a Specialist Fourth Class in the United
States Army stationed in the Republic of Korea, was accused and
indicted by Korean authorities of having murdered a Korean National
and of arson while off post, and, pursuant to the 1966 Status of Forces
Agreement 4 , he was incarcerated by the United States Army pending
disposition of the criminal charges in the Korean court. His petition for
4 T.I.A.S. 6127.
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a writ of habeas corpus alleged that he was being illegally detained and
that the United States Army did not have the authority to release him
to the Korean authorities. The thrust of petitioner's argument was that,
if the Status of Forces Agreement was invalid, the 1950 Taejon
Agreement' between the United States and Korea which had provided
that the "United States courts-martial may exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of the United States Military Establishment in
Korea," remains in effect.
In response to petitioner's argument that the Status of Forces
Agreement with Korea was not ratified by the United States Senate,
and that the method of trial of servicemen abroad under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and the Constitution cannot be altered by
Executive Agreement, the Court found that the Status of Forces
Agreement with Korea constituted only a unilateral waiver by Korea of
criminal jurisdiction in certain limited cases such as offenses solely
involving United States citizens or property, or an event arising out of
an act or omission done in the performance of official duty. Thus, the
Status of Forces Agreement embodied the consent of the Korean
Government to a diminished role in the enforcing of its territorial laws
without any corresponding or reciprocal commitment on the part of
the United States, and the court held that Senate ratification was not
necessary for the Republic of Korea to unilaterally grant jurisdiction to
which the United States otherwise would not have any rightful claim.
As to petitioner's argument that the Korean system of criminal
justice is inherently violative of his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said:
"Furthermore, the petitioner fails to point out to the satisfaction
of this court by what authority the United States may dictate to a

sovereign nation the procedure to be followed by that nation in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction over alleged violators of its criminal
laws. Under international law, the United States is without authority to

infringe upon that jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Girard [354 U.S.
524 (1957)] was surely aware that the due process safeguards of the

Japanese courts differed from those of the courts of the United States,
yet the Court did not look upon this as a fatal defect in determining

that Japan had the power to try Girard. Realistically, the question
resolves itself into a balancing of the national interest justifying the
stationing of troops abroad against the possibility of any deprivation of
constitutionally protected rights at the hands of foreign local law which

does not conform to American standards. It is the determination of this
s T.I.A.S. 3012.
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court that the national interest outweighs any other considerations. To
argue that under the applicable rule of international law, visiting forces
retain jurisdiction is to close one's eyes to the historical fact that this
matter is no longer left up to the implications of law but is carefully
expressed in agreements which are explicit qualifications of consent to
station visiting forces." [286 F. Supp. at 101-102]

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 2

423

